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Abstract
Background: Despite a global recognition from all stakeholders of the gravity and urgency of health worker shortage
in Africa, little progress has been achieved to improve health worker coverage in many of the African human resources
for health (HRH) crisis countries. The problem consists in how policy is made, how leaders are accountable, how the
World Health Organization (WHO) and foreign donors encourage (or distort) health policy, and how development
objectives are prioritized in these countries.
Methods: This paper uses political economy analysis, which stems from a recognition that the solution to the shortage
of health workers across Africa involves more than a technical response. A number of institutional arrangements
dampen investments in HRH, including a mismatch between officials’ tenure in office and program results, the
vertical nature of health programming, the modalities of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in health, the
structures of the global health community, and the weak capacity in HRH units within Ministries of Health. A major
change in policymaking would only occur with a disruption to the political or institutional order.
Results/conclusions: The case study of Ethiopia, who has increased its health workforce dramatically over the last
20 years, disrupted previous institutional arrangements through the power of ideas—HRH as a key intermediate
development objective. The framing of HRH created the rationale for the political commitment to HRH investment.
Ethiopia demonstrates that political will coupled with strong state capacity and adequate resource mobilization can
overcome the institutional hurdles above. Donors will follow the lead of a country with long-term political commitment
to HRH, as they did in Ethiopia.
Introduction
The genesis of the human resources for health (HRH)
crisis in African countries is complex and context spe-
cific, even if common factors are applicable across the
region [1]. Underinvestment in the social sector, which
accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s as part of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank struc-
tural adjustment programs, undermined the health
sector [2–6]. The health worker situation in developing
countries has deteriorated to crisis levels due to a variety
of factors, including political instability and weak health
systems, characterized by poor working conditions, while
further exacerbated by the migration of health workers
to industrialized countries.
The purpose of this paper is to shift the discussion of
the solution to the HRH shortage in Africa from the
“what” (technical) to the “how” (political). The standard
explanation for the health worker shortage is often lim-
ited to weak bureaucratic capacity and insufficient re-
sources, which ignores a host of political and economic
factors that discourages greater HRH investment. Des-
pite significant attention to the need for more health
workers for over a decade, national HRH plans remain
under-financed and ultimately not executed and further
explanation is needed.
This paper begins with a short description of the extent
of the problem. The “Methods” section outlines the param-
eters of a political economy analysis for HRH which offers
a three-level analysis of institutions or structures that shape
HRH policy, namely, the political environment, domestic
institutions, and international structures. This is followed
by a case study of how Ethiopia overcame these barriers to
make substantial progress in increasing HRH coverage.
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Background
The lack of health workers in low-income countries has
been recognized as a development challenge since the
1970s, beginning with the Alma Ata Declaration or
Health for All campaign in 1978 and later nested in
broader discussions of structural adjustment in the
1980s and 1990s. HRH rose to the top of the global
health agenda through the publication of the Joint
Learning Initiative’s report in 2004 and the World
Health Report in 2006, which described the extent of the
shortage of health workers in a number of countries.
Donor agencies responded by targeting increased pro-
duction of health workers as a key development object-
ive [5, 7–9]. In the re-authorization of the President’s
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2008, the
legislation set a worldwide target of 140,000 new health
workers to be trained by 2013 using PEPFAR funds [8].
In 1978, the World Health Organization (WHO) set a
target of one physician per 5000 people in the Alma Ata
Declaration/Health for All [10]. In 2006, WHO adopted
a threshold of 2.28 skilled health workers per 1000
people; if a country falls below that prescribed threshold,
WHO refers to it as an HRH crisis country. There is an
empirical basis for this target; it represents the minimum
level of coverage needed for 80 % of pregnant women to
have adequate ante- and post-natal care and assistance
at birth from a skilled health worker, who is defined as a
medical officer (physician or doctor), nurse, or midwife
(with a 4-year college degree or equivalent) [3].
According to WHO, there are 57 HRH crisis countries
as of 2011 and 37 in Sub-Saharan Africa. The data in
Table 1 and Fig. 1 illustrating the number of medical
doctors in Africa reveals a legacy of severe shortages. In
the face of the persistent lack of health workers in a
number of African countries, progress has been slow. In
1970, 33 out of 41 African countries had a physician ra-
tio below one medical doctor per 10,000 population (the
physician density), and excluding South Africa (and
Namibia, which was part of South Africa until 1993), no
African country had a physician density above 2.0 per
10,000 people. By 2010, 27 countries still had a physician
density below one per 10,000, and of the 43 countries,
only Gabon (2.60), Sudan (2.80), Equatorial Guinea
(3.02), Botswana (3.36), Nigeria (3.67), Namibia (4.27),
Cape Verde (5.48), and South Africa (7.38) exceeded a
physician density of two per 10,000 [11]. Even those
countries with seemingly high densities of health
workers are beset with HRH mal-distribution between
rural and urban areas and between the public and pri-
vate sectors.
Notwithstanding their severe shortages, most HRH
crisis countries have made little progress in increasing
the production of new health workers. Many have imple-
mented some form of task-shifting—a policy that
expands the scope of work of lower skilled health
workers to cover activities that higher skilled health
workers would usually perform [12]. An example of this
is nurse-initiated management of anti-retroviral therapy
(NIMART), which began in the Southern African region,
necessitated by the shortage of physicians [13]. Many
HRH crisis countries have implemented new recruitment
and retention schemes, with varying success [14, 15].
Task-shifting and retention programs have extensive liter-
atures, and they are outside the scope of this paper. The
production of more health workers is necessary, and the
failure of many African countries to do so will be the focus
of the political economy analysis below.
Methods
The rationale for a political economy analysis of HRH
stems from a recognition that the solution to the short-
age of health workers across Africa involves more than a
technical response. The problem consists in how policy
is made, how leaders are accountable, how WHO and
foreign donors encourage (or distort) health policy, and
how development objectives are prioritized in these
countries. Fundamentally, this is a political process,
which presents constraints and opportunities for poten-
tially effective technical solutions to be adopted and im-
plemented. In this article, a series of assumptions
characterize the policy process broadly [16–18]:
 Ambiguity—there are multiple ways to frame any
policy problem.
 Competition—few problems receive substantial
attention and move to the top of the agenda.
 Bounded rationality—politicians and bureaucrats
must make decisions based on limited or manipulated
information.
 Interests—all politicians and bureaucrats have
personal and professional ones.
 Incentives—institutions, or the rules of the game,
and resources create incentives for all politicians and
bureaucrats, which influences and ultimately shapes
their behavior.
 Disruption—only upheaval in the political or
institutional order leads to a change in the policy
change, which might be an election, a new
technology, or a powerful idea.
A political economy analysis was adapted to explain
the lack of progress in the HRH space, namely, the inad-
equate production of health workers. This approach ap-
plied economic thinking to politics framed by the
assumptions above [16, 19]. This institutional political
economy approach has become a common tool for un-
derstanding the political constraints in development and
policymaking generally [18, 19]. The political economy
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Table 1 Ratio of physicians to population (1 MD/10,000), 43 African countries, 1970–2010
Country 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Angola 1.16 0.59 0.42 0.77 0.80 1.66
Benin 0.34 0.59 0.73 0.51 0.58 0.40 0.59
Botswana 0.64 1.33 1.23 1.94 2.38 2.88 3.68 3.36
Burkina Faso 0.10 0.18 0.04 0.29 0.34 0.40 0.50 0.47
Burundi 0.17 0.12 0.52 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.28
Cameroon 0.34 0.72 0.71 0.82 0.74 1.90 0.77
Cape Verde 0.82 1.76 3.29 2.88 1.71 4.90 2.95
Cen. Afr. Rep. 0.23 0.43 0.38 0.35 0.80 0.48
Chad 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.33 0.25 0.39
Congo 1.01 1.74 1.19 2.52 2.76 2.51 2.00 0.95
Cote d’Ivoire 0.64 0.71 0.88 0.90 1.20 1.44
Dem. Rep. Congo 0.35 0.36 0.73 0.75 0.66 0.69 1.07
Equatorial Guinea 0.86 2.81 2.08 3.02
Eritrea 0.30 0.50
Ethiopia 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.31 0.27 0.21 0.26 0.22
Gabon 1.91 4.57 5.18 4.94 2.89 2.92
Gambia 0.41 0.40 0.81 0.26 0.73 1.09 0.38
Ghana 0.78 0.78 0.67 0.43 0.62 0.76 1.50 0.96
Guinea 0.20 0.22 0.26 1.34 1.30 0.94 1.00 1.00
Guinea-Bissau 0.52 1.41 1.44 1.71 1.66 1.20 0.45
Kenya 1.25 1.27 0.99 1.54 0.45 1.32 1.39 1.81
Lesotho 0.32 0.32 0.71 0.43 0.54 0.49
Liberia 0.79 0.80 1.06 1.07 0.23 0.30 0.14
Madagascar 0.97 0.96 0.99 1.01 1.20 2.72 2.90 1.61
Malawi 0.13 0.19 0.87 0.22 0.28 0.20 0.19
Mali 0.23 0.23 0.39 0.39 0.51 0.43 0.44 0.80 0.83
Mauritania 0.56 0.55 1.13 0.63 1.38 1.10 1.30
Mozambique 0.53 0.25 0.21 0.12 0.24 0.29 0.26
Namibia 2.31 2.63 2.95 3.00 3.74
Niger 0.17 0.16 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.20 0.19
Nigeria 0.50 0.49 1.13 1.92 1.92 1.92 2.69 2.80 3.95
Rwanda 0.17 0.17 0.32 0.27 0.40 0.56 0.24 0.56
Senegal 0.63 0.61 0.79 0.77 0.55 0.75 0.55 0.60 0.59
Sierra Leone 0.56 0.54 0.58 0.75 0.73 0.30 0.22
Somalia 0.37 0.38 0.46 0.71 0.41 0.35 0.35
South Africa 5.39 5.51 6.13 6.24 5.93 7.70 7.70 7.58
Sudan 0.68 0.68 1.10 0.96 0.97 1.58 2.20 2.80
Swaziland 1.24 0.53 1.08 1.51 1.76 1.60 1.70
Tanzania 0.44 0.44 0.35 0.40 0.41 0.08 0.08 0.08
Togo 0.35 0.35 0.55 1.01 0.88 0.76 0.40 0.40 0.53
Uganda 1.08 1.08 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.40 0.47 1.17 1.17
Zambia 0.73 0.74 0.76 1.41 0.92 0.69 0.88 0.66
Zimbabwe 1.62 1.58 1.61 1.62 1.35 1.39 0.57 1.60 0.62
Source: World Development Indicators [11]
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analysis in this paper is applied to a literature review and
later on Ethiopia as a case study.
This article adopts a broader institutional political
economy approach to analyze the HRH crisis in Africa
by examining multiple levels—the political environment,
domestic institutions, and international structures. This
paper applies the key tenets of a political economy ana-
lysis to the lack of progress in increasing health worker
density with HRH crisis countries in Africa. The political
environment refers to the competition to frame the de-
velopment agenda, the influence of civil society, and the
interests of stakeholders. Domestic institutions refer to the
capacity of the public sector and the incentives driving pol-
icymaker actions. International structures include the role
of donors, global campaigns, and WHO guidelines and in-
struments, including the WHO Global Code of Practice on
International Recruitment of Health Personnel. The ana-
lysis of these three levels reveals opportunities to encour-
age more action within the HRH space and specifically the
increased production of health workers.
Results and discussion
Political environment
Multiple stakeholders in the HRH sector
In most African countries, at least a dozen stakeholders
occupy the HRH policy space: Ministries of Education,
Health, Finance, and Public Service; training institutions
(public and private); professional boards and associa-
tions; WHO; and international donors [20]. With all
those actors, it is difficult to assign blame (or credit) to
an individual for the failure (or success) to meet ad-
equate staffing levels. The multiple stakeholders in the
HRH space effectively insulate politicians from blame
and prevent them from taking credit.
If a politician or bureaucrat sought to expand HRH
production, agreement among all parties would be
needed. A proposal for greater HRH investment would
produce immediate rivalry or conflict between or among
ministries. Not only would a consensus need to be
reached for an increased production of health worker,
the public service ministry would also have to accede to
the budget allocation for additional posts, and the fi-
nance ministry would have to guarantee adequate fund-
ing for such expansion in numbers. The number of
players with a veto in the HRH space transforms HRH
into a collective action problem.
Limited resources
Decisions are often resource-driven, and politicians in de-
veloping countries face a myriad of social demands, from
agriculture and food security to transportation, infrastruc-
ture, education, and health. Despite high disease burdens,
only a handful of African nations (Rwanda, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Zambia, Mali, and Niger) have met the
Abuja Declaration (2001) that set a target of 15 % of gov-
ernment revenue to be directed to health [21]. In the con-
tentious world of agenda setting, health ministers and
their teams seem to make unconvincing arguments to
their finance peers or their bosses (the national executive),
or they fail to frame health as value for money.
Policymakers often view expenditure on health as con-
sumption of resources, rather than as an investment,
and this is evident in national strategies. Politicians also
need to deal with their national disease burden, with
health budgets often targeting vertical programs: HIV,
TB, malaria, or maternal health (e.g., a campaign to end
obstetric fistulas). The prioritization of vertical programs
over HRH production and, more broadly, health system
strengthening plague Ministries of Health at all levels of
development [22] with only a small fraction of the US$
6 trillion spent annually on health around the world go-
ing to pre-service education [23, 24].
Weak civil society pressure
Citizens usually do not place blame on politicians for a
clinic that is not properly staffed because they are not
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Fig. 1 The range of physician density (per 10,000) among African countries, selected years. Eritrea and Namibia were omitted from the 1970 and
1985 results because they were not independent states at this time
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necessarily aware of what a fully staffed clinic would
look like. Even if they did, the link between the under-
staffed clinic and the corresponding decisions by politi-
cians is not immediately clear [25], and there is little
confidence in many African countries that structural
problems will be addressed [26]. Information on national
health worker density is often unavailable, and when it
is, it is often outdated. The lack of a clear causal arrow
between health worker density and health outcomes and
the paucity of information makes it difficult for citizens
to mobilize around HRH issues.
While the role of civil society engagement in policy-
making and implementation has been highlighted
through the development process for the WHO Code of
Practice, this level of engagement has been missing after
adoption of the Code and has been partly held respon-
sible for the poor uptake, implementation, and impact of
the Code [27]. Despite the best efforts of NGOs like the
Frontline Health Workers Coalition, the absence of advo-
cacy from civil society, both domestically and internation-
ally, encourages the malaise towards health workforce
issues.
Domestic institutions
Mismatch between electoral cycles/tenure in office and
programmatic results
Politicians and bureaucrats need to claim credit for
some achievement or success to further their careers,
and they face substantial professional disincentives for
HRH investment. Longer-term investments are not at-
tractive to many politicians or ministers, especially if
they continue after the end of their mandate [28]. It is
nearly impossible for a politician or minister to claim
credit for a new school or hospital if it was completed
after their tenure. The time needed to compose a plan
for health worker production might take up to 2 years,
and production of one highly skilled health worker
might take 4 to 6 years. Governments seeking to increase
production will not see the evidence of their strategies for
at least 6 to 10 years. Tenure of most ministers is less than
5 years, which entices them to adopt policies and strat-
egies which deliver more immediate results [29].
Weak capacity in the bureaucracy (specifically the HRH
unit)
One of the greatest impediments to the production of
more health workers is the lack of bureaucratic capacity
within national Ministries of Health. The HRH units are
hampered by the lack of a clear mandate, poor technical
skills, and weak coordinating powers to utilize expertise
from within the ministry or broader government where
they exist. Of the 57 HRH crisis countries in Africa, 31
of them had HRH strategic plans by 2009. International
consultants wrote most of these plans, and the
subsequent dependence on international consultants
means that the plan is not country-owned and little skill
transfer occurs. After the consultants leave, the staff in
the HRH units neither have the acumen to implement
the plans nor the skills to monitor the activities of the
plan [30–32].
Part of country ownership is that policy entrepreneur-
ship is required to champion a policy change as inten-
sive as the implementation of an HRH plan, without
which, the domestic policy entrepreneurs or champions
do not exist. The lack of policy champions or entrepre-
neurs for HRH has been one of the reasons that the
commitment of resources required for a major scale-up
in production has not occurred. John Kingdon describes
a policy entrepreneur who “lie(s) in wait in and around
government with their solutions at hand, waiting for
problems to float by to which they can attach their solu-
tions, waiting for a development in the political stream
they can use to their advantage” [17]. Within many Min-
istries of Health across Africa, few bureaucrats have the
technical acumen to be effective policy champions.
Those that do are often constrained by office politics
[29, 32]. The status of the position of the HRH director
widely varies in ministries, and the role is not usually
considered a prestigious or high-profile post. The pos-
ition of a director or office chief is tied to a Principal
Secretary (PS) or Director-General (DG), who is usually
the second in line under the Minister, and does not want
to be viewed as disruptive or antagonistic [30].
International structures
The role of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)
ODA might impede domestic efforts to increase HRH
production. Many donors provide assistance on an an-
nual basis, which renders long-term planning impossible.
Aid agencies drive Ministries of Health towards treat-
ment of specific diseases (e.g., HIV and TB) in part be-
cause they are anxious to take credit for their assistance
in saving lives to placate various stakeholders (from par-
liaments or legislatures) who determine their annual
budgets [7, 22, 24]. Other health issues take precedent
due to their urgency and relative ease to solve.
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)/Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs)
While the MDGs did pressure developing countries and
the donor community to mobilize towards achieving im-
portant targets in global health, the MDGs and the
SDGs that have followed suffer from an emphasis on
final targets without an adequate focus on intervening
or secondary targets that influence primary health out-
comes. Traditionally, maternal mortality has been con-
sidered a robust proxy for the strength of a health
system, but HRH issues like the production of more
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health workers were largely absent from the discussion
of MDG 5 [33, 34]. The post-2015 global development
agenda might be another missed opportunity as emer-
ging issues, such as climate change, sanitation, water,
and gender-based violence, crowd out the HRH issue.
The vertical structures within global health
When donors want to address an issue in global health,
they often decide that it will be through an alliance inde-
pendent of the WHO, e.g., HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS was
established as a separate entity), TB (STOP TB), and the
war against immunizable diseases (Global Alliance for
Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)). In HRH, this took
the form of the Global Health Workforce Alliance
(GHWA). Notwithstanding the successes of these paral-
lel structures, the pattern is clear: once WHO identifies
a priority area, there is a tendency to establish a separate
structure to work on the problem. Much of the justification
speaks to the rigidity of the WHO system, which in most
cases means that donors want to retain absolute control of
their resources through these structures [35–38].
GHWA did provide resources to countries on a wide
range of technical aspects of HRH and provided a forum
that mobilized some civil society groups and some ODA
for HRH. From 2009 to 2014, PEPFAR spent US$ 2.5
billion on HRH and established a target of 140,000 new
health workers to be trained by 2013 [8]. Despite these
successes, GHWA did not produce an adequate level of
resource mobilization from domestic and international
sources to address the shortage of health workers in the
37 African crisis countries. GHWA also might have had
the unintended consequence of isolating HRH and limit-
ing the potential linkages to other health issues like ma-
ternal and child mortality.
The WHO Global Code of Practice on International
Recruitment of Health Personnel
The Code was adopted after a protracted period of nego-
tiation in May 2010. The guiding principles of the WHO
Code include ethical international recruitment of health
workers, a focus on the health system in the context of
HRH sustainability, fair treatment of migrant health
workers, support to developing countries and especially
HRH crisis countries, data gathering on HRH migration,
and information exchange [39, 40]. With the Code came
expectations that countries would make adequate invest-
ments in their HRH production and retention and would
strengthen HRH governance structures. The Code also
called for bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements that
recognize the contexts of different countries, e.g., bilat-
eral agreements for one country to recruit health
workers in another country.
Brain drain largely overshadowed the broader discus-
sion at the World Health Assembly, which the Code
addressed through three principles: (1) the right of a
health worker to migrate is a human right; (2) countries
are free to accept migrant health labor, but they should
not recruit actively for it; and (3) labor-receiving coun-
tries have no responsibility to compensate labor-sending
countries for their loss of labor [39]. The final point con-
tinues to be particularly contentious among HRH crisis
countries. The Code was viewed not as a path to deal
with the HRH shortage systematically but rather as an
unfair compromise in which the negotiation was a zero-
sum game that labor-receiving countries won [41, 42].
As a result, the Code was never the comprehensive
framework or the disruptive force for HRH mobilization
that it was intended to be.
Within development circles, the issue of relevance be-
came the most severe criticism of a political economy
approach. In 2011, a World Bank report summarized:
“While political economy studies appear to be useful in
providing insight into the country context and facilitate
a better and quicker understanding of the realities on
the ground, translating political economy analysis into
action remains a challenge” [19]. If a change is to occur
in the policy agenda, it usually happens due to a disrup-
tion in the political or institutional arrangements. This
tumult in the status quo might take the form of a regime
change, an election result, an emerging idea, or a new
technology [17, 18]. This paper offers Ethiopia as an ex-
ample of how HRH crisis countries might create the dis-
ruption needed to overcome the political and structural
hurdles for greater health worker coverage.
The Ethiopian experience
Upon the release of the 2006 WHO Report, Ethiopia
had among the lowest health worker densities in the
world. Ethiopia has made substantial progress in im-
proving health worker coverage, even if it failed to in-
crease the production of physicians as shown in Table 1.
Ethiopia increased its health worker density (including
all cadres) per 1000 population from 0.43 in 2003 to
0.86 in 2008, and Ethiopia expanded its enrollment of
medical doctor trainees from below 300 in 2005 to 3100
in 2012 [43]. The Ethiopian example shows that oppor-
tunities do exist in overcoming these political economy
barriers.
Political will
In the mid-1990s, Ethiopia committed to a long-term
(20 plus years) strategy to address health service
provision. At a very low level of health worker density,
Ethiopia recognized that progress in HRH would require
decades to improve service coverage. In the face of a
crowded development agenda, HRH needed to be linked
with other development objectives to be prioritized. The
Health Sector Development Program (HSDP) is a
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multiple-phase plan to improve health service coverage
and provision in which HRH planning was explicitly part
of all four of its iterations [43, 44].
Ethiopia’s HRH plan within HSDP phase III from 2005
to 2009 was designed to address coverage issues first
through the deployment of health extension workers
(community health workers) and only later to increase
the stock of more skilled health cadres. Ethiopia also in-
troduced a new cadre of health workers, the health offi-
cer, to provide basic health services and to manage the
expansion of its public health service. In 2009, the Min-
istry revealed its HRH Strategy 2020, a plan that ad-
dressed higher skilled health cadres, in particular
medical doctors, whose stock was planned to rise from
less than 5000 in 2009 to 50,000 trained by 2020.
Ethiopia is on track to meet this target, which is to be
reflected in its number of physicians in 2015 [43].
As a stepping stone to better service provision, the
health workforce was prioritized in achieving better
health outcomes. This framing of HRH formed the basis
of the political will to sustain the program over many
years. The power of the idea that HRH was a crucial
element in improved health services disrupted the previ-
ous order by changing the priorities within the develop-
ment agenda. The national long-term commitment to
HRH resulted in access to resources with domestic
stakeholders forced to work within the directive of the
HSDP.
State capacity
One of the major obstacles for HRH crisis countries to
raise their health worker density is the weak capacity of
the government to plan and coordinate effectively. Dur-
ing the process of expanding the health workforce,
Ethiopia implemented Business Process Reengineering
(BPR) at all its federal and regional governing depart-
ments and units. BPR was a program to introduce
results-based management to the public sector. Despite
mixed results, BPR strengthened capacity in the govern-
ment overall. The Ministry of Health demonstrated its
increased capacity in the quality of its strategic planning
in health and HRH, its donor coordination, and its man-
agement of large sums of ODA.
As HRH was emerging as a global issue in the first
decade of the 2000s, nearly every HRH crisis country in
Africa wrote a strategic HRH plan to address its own
health worker shortage. Many national HRH plans suf-
fered from similar problems: over-ambitious targets, dis-
ruptions (or even abandonment) due to leadership
changes, little political support, and weak resource
mobilization. Ethiopia differed in that it wrote its first
HRH plan in 1995, a decade before the publication of
World Health Report 2006. The plan included a thor-
ough costing of all activities; it was monitored rigorously
and evaluated independently; and stakeholders, external
and internal, considered the plans to be country-owned.
The successive HRH plans became an advocacy tool do-
mestically and globally, particularly for donors [45–48].
Ethiopia has had authoritarian governance for the last
two decades, and there might be a temptation to argue
that authoritarianism might be good for development
and HRH specifically.
Without the pressure from civil society or an elector-
ate in a democratic society, as the argument follows,
bureaucrats are free to act and implement effective de-
velopment policies that might be unpopular in the
short-term. Another interpretation of this argument is
skeptical that democratic rule can promote good govern-
ance in new regimes in Africa [49]. This argument might
seem compelling, but there are reasons to discount it.
Many HRH crisis countries have authoritarian regimes,
and they have failed to achieve any improvement in
health worker density. Democratic regimes are likely to
have better development outcomes, because mechanisms
of accountability encourage politicians and bureaucrats
to act on behalf of the common good [50]. In the case of
Ethiopia, there is no way to know if the policy trajectory
towards better health outcomes and increased HRH
coverage would have been different or not under demo-
cratic rule.
Resource mobilization
Ethiopia has received a large amount of ODA in health.
In current, purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, Ethio-
pia’s total per capita health spending nearly tripled from
US$ 28 in 2005 to US$ 69 in 2013, largely due to ODA.
From 2003 to 2009, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tu-
berculosis and Malaria (GFATM) gave Ethiopia over
US$ 3 billion, and from 2007 to 2014, PEPFAR provided
US$ 2 billion [45] with US$ 165 million specifically ear-
marked for HRH production between 2009 and 2014
[46]. While other countries, especially those with gener-
alized HIV epidemics, experienced similar growth in
health spending, a significant proportion of the ODA re-
ceived by Ethiopia was allocated to support HRH pro-
duction, which was not the case in other HRH crisis
countries [24, 47, 48].
This was a direct result of the strategic health plans
adopted and implemented by the Ethiopian government
which donors could support and convince their own
stakeholders of the potential impact. Even though do-
nors have their own interests and face domestic pres-
sures regarding ODA, they are also open to recipient
country initiatives. Despite the inconsistency of annual
ODA flows and large off-budget funding in vertical pro-
grams, Ethiopia channeled their assistance into increas-
ing health worker density through thoughtful planning
and coordination with donors. Its Ministry of Finance
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and Economic Development designed the Aid Manage-
ment Platform to harmonize the various streams of
ODA, which has become a best practice for donor co-
ordination [44, 47]. A government official from Ethiopia
commented, “What development partners need is open-
ness, accountability and results. This is why support
from development partners, whether bilateral or multi-
lateral, is increasing. They are all working with the policy
and program frameworks prepared by the government
through broad consultations with stakeholders” [44].
Conclusions
Despite a global recognition of the gravity and urgency
of health worker shortage in Africa, little progress has
been achieved to improve health worker coverage in
many of the African HRH crisis countries generally.
Powerful political and institutional incentives push
stakeholders at the domestic and international levels not
to invest in HRH. The status quo of institutional ar-
rangements needs to be changed for new policy choices
to reach the top of the agenda, and ideas have the power
to be the earthquake to disrupt the previous rules of the
game. Good governance and some degree of bureau-
cratic capacity alone do not ensure a successful HRH
plan. We argue that political will, in the form of a
long-term commitment to HRH, is essential to
mobilize internal and external resources. We also con-
tend that this political commitment to HRH was the
product of framing—policy entrepreneurs successfully
tied more health workers to better health services for
more Ethiopians.
Donors play a vital role in the HRH space, but they
should not be leading the charge. The case of Ethiopia
shows that if recipient countries present a reasonable
national HRH plan to donors, they are willing to support
it through ODA, as long as the donors receive attribu-
tion for results that they can present to their legislatures
or parliaments. The WHO Global Code of Practice on
International Recruitment of Health Personnel was a
missed opportunity to create a regime of monitoring of
health worker density, similar to the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals. The monitoring of HRH progress remains a
significant challenge for many HRH crisis countries.
The WHO target of 2.28 skilled health workers per
1000 people might require 20 years or more for some
African countries to attain, and the project would need
to outlive individual directors of HRH units, Ministries
of Health, and heads of state. Consensus politics is diffi-
cult to practice and maintain in any country, and it has
been elusive in most of the HRH crisis countries in Africa.
Even though Ethiopia has enjoyed initial success, it re-
quires at least another decade to reach the WHO health
worker target. While Ethiopia provides an example of a
country that is successfully navigating its way past the very
same political economy challenges facing other African
HRH crisis countries, it is abundantly clear that there re-
mains no quick fix for the HRH shortage.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Katherine Igoe, Joan Matji, Paul Vacik,
Andrew Mitchell, and John Palen for their contributions to the paper.
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the United States Agency
for International Development; the East, Central and Southern Africa Health
Community; or the University of KwaZulu-Natal.
Authors’ contributions
JF, YD, and KB contributed towards the original concept, and GG contributed
to the final design. JF drafted the manuscript with substantial input from YD,
KB, and GG, and all authors critically reviewed and contributed towards the
manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Completing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Author details
1Regional HIV/AIDS Program, U.S. Agency for International Development,
Pretoria, South Africa. 2East, Central and Southern Africa Health Community,
Arusha, Tanzania. 3Health Economics and HIV/AIDS Research Division
(HEARD), University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa.
Received: 28 February 2015 Accepted: 21 June 2016
References
1. Dussault G, Franceschini M. Not enough there, too many here:
understanding geographical imbalances in the distribution of the health
workforce. Hum Resour Health. 2006;4:12.
2. Joint Learning Initiative (JLI). Human resources for health: overcoming the
crisis. Global Equity Initiative. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 2004.
3. Chen L, Evans T, Anand S, Boufford J, Brown H, Chowhery M, Cueto M,
Dare L, Dussault G, Wlzinga G, Fee E, Habte D, Hanvoravongchai P,
Jacobs M, Kurowski C, Michael S, Pablos-Mendez A, Sewankamba N,
Solimano G, Stillwell B, de Waal A, Wibulpalprasert S. Human resources
for health: overcoming the crisis. Lancet. 2004;364:1984–90.
4. Mullan F. The metrics of the physician brain drain. N Engl J Med.
2005;353:1801–8.
5. Windisch R, Wyss K, Prytherch K. A cross-country review of strategies of the
German development cooperation to strengthen human resources. Hum
Resour Health. 2009;7.
6. World Health Organization. World Health Report 2006: working together for
health. Geneva: WHO; 2006.
7. Bowser D, Sparkes S, Mitchell A, Bossert T, Bärnighausen T, Gedik G, Atun R.
Global Fund investments in human resources for health: innovation and
missed opportunities for health systems strengthening. Health Policy Plan.
2014;29:986–97.
8. U.S. Office of Global AIDS Coordinator. PEPFAR human resources for health
strategy. 2015.
9. Featherstone L. The UK’s work on human resources for health care. London;
2013.
10. Mills E, Schabas W, Volmink J, Walker R, Ford N, Katabira E, Anema A, Joffres
M, Cahn P, Montaner J. Should active recruitment of health workers from
sub-Saharan Africa be viewed as a crime? Lancet. 2008;371:685–8.
11. World Development Indicators. [http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators]. Accessed 3 Mar 2016.
12. Samb B, Celletti F, Holloway J, Van Damme W, De Cock M, Dybal M. Rapid
expansion of the health workforce in response to the HIV epidemic. N Engl
J Med. 2007;357:2510.
13. Callaghan M, Ford N, Schneider H. A systematic review of task- shifting for
HIV treatment and care in Africa. Hum Resour Health. 2010;8:8.
14. Gow J, George G, Mwamba S, Ingombe L, Mutinta G. An evaluation of the
effectiveness of the Zambian health worker retention scheme (ZHWRS) for
rural areas. African Health Stud. 2013;13:800–7.
15. World Health Organization. Increasing access to health workers in remote and
rural areas through improved retention: global policy recommendations. 2010.
Fieno et al. Human Resources for Health  (2016) 14:44 Page 8 of 9
16. Cairney P. Understanding public policy: theories and issues. London:
Palgrave MacMillian; 2012.
17. Kingdon J. Agendas, alternatives, and public policies. Boston: Little, Brown;
1984.
18. United Nations Development Programme. Institutional and context analysis
guidance note. 2012.
19. Hudson D, Leftwich A. From political economy to political analysis.
Developmental Leadership Program. United Kingdom: University of
Birmingham; 2014.
20. Omaswa F, Crisp N. Health leadership in Africa. In: Omaswa F, Crisp N,
editors. African health leaders: making change and claiming the future.
Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2014.
21. Gawanas B. Politics, economics and society. In: Omaswa F, Crisp N, editors.
African health leaders: making change and claiming the future. Oxford:
Oxford University Press; 2014.
22. Gottret P, Schieber G. Health financing revisited: a practitioner’s guide.
Washington: World Bank; 2006.
23. Pasricha T. A doctor of my own: the first medical students of Namibia.
Washington: Film presented at the Consortium of Universities for Global
Health (CUGH) annual conference; 2014.
24. Garbayo A, Campbell J, Nakari T. Value for money, sustainability and
accountability in health: a new governance framework in Africa towards
and beyond the MDGs. 2012.
25. World Health Organization. Health systems in Africa: community
perceptions and perspectives. 2012.
26. Logan C, Bratton M. Claiming democracy: are voters becoming citizens in
Africa? AfricaPlus. 2013.
27. Dambiysa Y, Malema N, Dulo C, Matinhure S. Learning from the
implementation of the WHO Global Code of Practice on the International
Recruitment of Health Workers. J Heal Dipl. 2015;1(3)
28. Golden M, Min B. Distributive politics around the world. Annu Rev Polit Sci.
2013;16:73–99.
29. Omaswa F, Boufford J. Strong ministries for strong health systems. A
strategy for health systems strengthening: supporting ministerial health
leadership. 2010.
30. Nyoni J, Gedik G. Health workforce governance and leadership capacity in
the African region: review of human resources for health units in the
Ministries of Health. Human Resources for Health Observer: Congo; 2012.
31. Nyoni J. Improving the health workforce in Africa: the weak link. Afr J
Midwifery Women’s Healthl. 2014;2.
32. Awases M, Nyoni J, Bessaoud K, Diarra-Nama A, Mwikisa C. Development of
human resources for health in the WHO African region: current situation
and way forward. Afr Health Monit. 2010;12:25–27.
33. Hogan M, Foreman K, Naghavi M, Ahn S, Wang M, Makela S, Lopez A,
Lozano R, Murray C. Maternal mortality in 181 countries, 1980–2008: a
systematic analysis of progress towards Millennium Development Goal 5.
Lancet. 2010;375:1609–23.
34. Taylor E, Hayman R, Crawford F, Jeffery P, Smith J. The impact on official
development aid on maternal and reproductive health outcomes: a
systematic review. PLoS One. 2013;8:e56271.
35. Hoffman S, Rottingen J. Split WHO in two: strengthening political
decision-making and securing independent scientific advice. Public
Health. 2014;128:188–94.
36. Youde J. Can the World Health Organization lead? Do we want it to?
Washington, DC: Washington Post; 2014.
37. Lee K, Pang T. WHO: retirement or reinvention? Public Health. 2014;128:119–23.
38. Gostin L, Sridhar D, Hougendobler D. The normative authority of the World
Health Organization. Public Health. 2015;129:854.
39. World Health Organization. WHO Global Code of Practice on the
International Recruitment of Health Personnel. 2010.
40. EQUINET. Taking the WHO Code of Practice on the International
Recruitment of Health Personnel from bottom drawer to negotiating table
and action in Africa. 2014.
41. Sharples N. Brain drain: migrants are the lifeblood of the NHS, it’s time that
UK paid for them. The Guardian. 2015.
42. Taylor A, Dhillon S. The WHO Global Code of Practice on the International
Recruitment of Health Personnel: the evolution of global health diplomacy.
Glob Health Gov. 2011;5:3-4. pages 7-8.
43. World Health Organization. Scaling up education and training human
resources in health in Ethiopia. 2010.
44. Banteyerga H, Kidanu A, Conteh L, McKee M. Ethiopia: placing health at the
center of development. In: Balabanova D, McKee M, Mills A, editors. “Good
health at low cost” 25 years on: what makes a successful health system?
2011.
45. Alemu G: A case study of aid effectiveness in Ethiopia. Washington, DC:
Wolfensohn Center for Development/Brookings Institution; 2009.
46. Banteyerga H. Ethiopia’s health extension program: improving health
through community involvement. MEDICC Rev. 2011;13:46.
47. El-Saharty S, Kebede S, Dubusho P, Siadat B. Ethiopia: improving health
service delivery. Washington: World Bank; 2009.
48. Campbell J, Settle D. Ethiopia: taking forward action on human resources
for health with DFID/OGAC and other partners. 2009.
49. Alence R. Political institutions and developmental governance in sub-
Saharan Africa. J Mod Afr Stud. 2004;42:163–87.
50. Halperin M, Seigel J, Weinstein M. The democratic advantage. New York:
Routledge; 2005.
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
Fieno et al. Human Resources for Health  (2016) 14:44 Page 9 of 9
